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Abstract.
 Metonymies are known as ways of conceptualizing entities and
situations of various sorts. For example, users of PCs usually call the icon
depicting a waste paper basket 'basket'. They thus use the name of the
depicted object for referring to the depicting object. We use a model
airplane ("Baufix" airplane) as the paradigm case for investigating the
semiotics of depictional metonymies and the role they are put to in
construction dialogue. The airplane's structure is described in a GPSG
format and given a model-theoretic semantics. We also describe how
aggregates of the toy model are given depictional interpretations in the
course of the construction dialogue. The coordinating role of metonymic
language use is illustrated. It is also shown how cognition can be integra-
ted into the model developed.
1 Motivation
In everyday talk as well as in scientific discussion people frequently use non-
literal language (tropes). Tropes are taken as a manifestation of productive or
creative language use. This is one of the reasons why the cognitive sciences,
including AI, are interested in theories of non-literal language (cf. (Indurkhya
1992), (Way, 1991)), especially in theories of metaphor and metonymy. Before
we describe the field we are interested in, i.e. metonymies based on depiction, we
provide some examples of metonymies in general (the metonymic expression is
underlined):
(a) I’m parking out back.       (b) The DRT-box is empty. (c) The airplane is built.
Metonymies are based on certain relations which they ”exploit”. E.g., (a) uses a
relation between the driver and the vehicle to refer to the vehicle with the first
person pronoun I, in (b) the object called box is really a rectangle, hence one uses
a relation between boxes’ surfaces and rectangles to refer to a particular DRT-
representation, and (c) is said of a toy-airplane, where a construction in ways yet
to be explained licenses the use of the word airplane.
Many types of metonymies exist and there does not seem to be one single theory
which can capture them all (cf. (Nunberg, 1995)). Example (c) is outstanding,
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since it exploits a relation between the toy in question and the class of airplanes.
The example meets another current interest of the cognitive sciences, namely the
interest in depiction (cf. (Sloman, 1971), (Glasgow et al., 1995), (Eschenbach &
Kulik, 1997) and (Habel, 1998)). In order to refer to drawings, maps, pictures,
models etc., we may use the names of the objects they ”are about”. Certain types
of metonymies, we observe, are based on a relation of depiction, of ”being about”
another object. These metonymies have an obvious application interest:
Computer icons, e.g., are called folders, waste-paper baskets etc. or – with CASE
tools – plants, objects and modules.
In our article we explain how the depiction relation for metonymies can be
reconstructed and properly interpreted. Our investigation is based on a corpus of
transcripts, speech recordings, video-films and eye-tracker data gathered in the
context of the following experimental setting: An instructor has a toy airplane
(called "Baufix" airplane) shown in fig. 1 in front of him. He instructs a construc-
tor to build an airplane of the same type using another set of parts lying in front
of him. Both agents are separated by a screen.
We use the example of the toy-airplane as a paradigm case for investigating
depictional metonymies and their role in construction dialogue.
2 Semiotics of Depicting Aggregates
Depicting aggregates such as the toy airplane refer to real-world objects, and this
reference depends on their compositional structure. Such aggregates must hence
be seen as structured semiotic objects. Consequently, we have to specify their
syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
2.1 Syntax
Our leading hypotheses for the syntax of depicting aggregates are:
1) Aggregates ultimately consist of elementary parts (”atoms”).
2) Aggregates are composed of atoms and of aggregates of lower complexity.
3) Aggregates are subject to well-formedness conditions concerning the connections of
atoms and partial aggregates to each other.
Of the many syntax formats possible, we chose GPSG for flexibility. We will
illustrate the syntax describing the structure of the tail of the "Baufix" airplane:
The atoms available for its construction are three-holes bars 3lli, five-holes bars
5lli, a red holes cube lwr1, a red round bolt ssr1, and hexagonal bolts skri. The
aggregate resulting from putting skr1 through an end hole of 3ll1 will be denoted
by [X1 f1, 3ll1, skr1]. Here, f1 is a syncategorematic terminal symbol describing
the special arrangement. The corresponding general grammar rule reads
R1: X1 ← f1, 3LL, SKR,
where 3LL denotes the category of three-holes bars, SKR indicates the category
of hexagonal bolts and X1 names an aggregate of instantiations of these. Further
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rules are R2: X2 ← f2, X1, LWR; R3: X3 ← f3, 5LL, SSR; R4: S ← f4, X2, X3.
R2 describes bolting a red holes cube onto an X1-structure; R3 describes forming
an aggregate of a five-holes bar and a round bolt put through its middle hole.
Bolting the round bolt of X3 into the suitable hole of the cube in X2 is described
by R4. This yields category S corresponding to the tail of the toy airplane. Further
rules such as 5LL ← 5ll1 describe instantiation of categories.
Fig. 1: "Baufix" airplane
2.2 Semantics
Here, our leading hypotheses are:
1) Semantics follows syntax (compositionality).
2) "Baufix" atoms denote themselves (autosemantics).
3) "Baufix" aggregates denote themselves or (parts of) real airplanes.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 reflect that dialogue agents do not conceive of isolated
"Baufix" atoms as depicting entities. Only more complex aggregates such as
given by S in 2.1 are seen as depicting.
Following these hypotheses, the domain of our models is sorted into "Baufix"
atoms, "Baufix" aggregates and (parts of) real airplanes.
The interpretation function is a pair of two functions, mapping every object x to
<VBf, Vap>(x), where VBf is the identity function and where the co-domain of Vap
is the set of (parts of) real airplanes. An object x is in the domain of Vap if and
only if it depicts (some part of) a real airplane.
We denote the meaning of an object x relative to a model M = (U, <VBf, Vap>) by
[[  x ]]M. The meaning of, e.g. f1 is [[  f1 ]]M = {<x,y>| x is put into an end hole of y}.
For "Baufix" atoms x, the meaning is the atom x itself, for elementary category
symbols such as 5LL, it is the set of instances of the category. Furthermore,
[[  [X1 f1, 3LL, SKR] ]]
M
 = [[   X1 ]]M is the set of all "Baufix" aggregates consisting of
a hexagonal bolt put into the end hole of a three-holes bar.
Finally, the meaning of S is a pair  <V, W>, where W consists of all tails of real
airplanes. Intuitively, V contains all pairs <x,y> of the following sort: The first
element x is an aggregate consisting of a three-holes bar and a red holes cube
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fixed to the bar by a hexagonal bolt put through the bar’s end hole. The second
element y is made up of a five-holes bar and a red round bolt put into its central
hole. The relation f4 captures the specific linkage between x and y.
Our approach accounts for the facts that only certain aggregates are named meto-
nymically and that metonymic and nonmetonymic expressions can alternate.
2.3 How to General ize the Approach
There are lots of toy models, all depicting planes. Even though models exhibit
their relation to airplanes in different ways, they ultimately may be bound to the
same extension. In this sense, the ”Baufix” airplane and the so-called ”Japanese”
airplane in fig. 2 depict the same class of airplanes in contrast to the ”Lego”
plane in the same figure depicting biplanes.
Why is it that models depict in the same way? The intuition accounting for that is
that some of their parts fulfil a comparable role as regards depiction. This of
course has to be captured by our syntactic description.
    
Fig. 2: ”Japanese” plane and "Lego plane“
We can achieve this target in at least two ways:
The first is to let the different models be generated by different grammars, more
generally, to set up a set of admissible grammars and to constrain these grammars
by a suitable filter. The second is to provide one single parameterized grammar.
Details are given in (Rieser & Meyer-Fujara, 1999).
Both techniques will provide the same extension for the ”Baufix” airplane and
the ”Japanese” one and weed out the ”Lego” plane.
2.4 Pragmatics:  Introduction of  Metonymies in Construction
Dialogue
Based on the generalized approach to depictive metonymy in 2.3, we can map
speakers onto their grammars. Hence, in order to explain why in a normal
situation speakers can fairly homogeneously and successfully use "airplane" for
different models, we must postulate that speakers use different grammars
employing extensionally equivalent relations of metonymy.
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However, in our experimental setting only the instructor has a stable grammar for
the object on his side throughout the construction dialogue, whereas the construc-
tor, screened off from him, will develop such a grammar in (ideally monotonic)
successive steps by the instructor’s help. Finally, as shown in fig. 3, he will have
acquired a grammar depicting airplanes.
At the end of the construction dialogue, we arrive at a situation where there exist
two grammars, GI and GC,m , generating the ”Baufix” airplanes at the instructor’s
and the constructor’s side, respectively. All along the construction dialogue, the
instructor’s grammar has been a necessary condition for the constructor’s
building of his version of the airplane. Ideally, the two ”Baufix” airplanes will
cover one common extension, i.e., depict in the same way.
Fig. 3: Constructor acquiring a grammar for depicting objects
3 Outlook
In our aproach we use extensional models for the definition of the meaning of
depicting aggregates. Objects in the model domain are things in the world,
namely real airplanes and their parts. We nevertheless aim at a cognitive interpre-
tation of our theories. We see two ways of integrating cognitive aspects:
As for the first way, agents consider depicting objects as being segmentable into
parts even if the objects are not put together from individual elements as
"Baufix" toy planes are. There are natural segmentations corresponding to prin-
ciples of object recognition as described, e.g., by Marr and Nishihara (1978). A
cognitively motivated syntax may start out from such segmentations, e.g., from
Description: GC,j: different stages of constructor’s grammar, GI: invariant
instructor’s grammar,            : interpretation
end of dialoguebeginning of dialogue time
extension: airplane
GI = ··· GI= ··· == GI GI=GIinstructor
extension:
tail
+ fuselage
extension:
tail
+ fuselage
+ wings
extension:
tail
objects
in
the
world
constructor GC,0 ··· GC,m⊂ ··· ⊂⊂ GC,3⊂GC,1 GC,2
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segmentations into geons in the sense of Biederman (1987).
As for the second way, one may use concepts instead of things as objects of the
model. Since concepts are not directly accessible, agglomerations of geometric
figures may be used in their place (cf. arguments given in (Biederman, 1987)).
Thus a relation is established between syntactic structure and concepts.
A further field of research is the examination of parameters of metonymy use in
order to get at pragmatic constraints, dealing with questions such as: When are
metonymic expressions introduced in dialogue? What is the profit gained from
their use? One of the main profits we found out is the possibility of intrinsic
orientation liberating from negotiating the meaning of 'up', 'in front', 'left', etc..
Further research in representation metonymy seems worth-while because of its
widespread use in WIMP user interfaces. Intelligent agents supporting users of
CASE or CAD/CIM systems will inevitably have to cope with depiction as well
as with the step-wise construction of meaning in dialogue.
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